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can effectively control the use of the writ in actions to recover for
foreign torts. At the same time, the plaintiff who asserts a good cause
of action and seeks recovery by attachment would not be denied all
access to the courts of Pennsylvania. It would seem that under the
Alpers decision, a resident must either seek recovery in personam25
within or without the Commonwealth since there is little chance the
plaintiff can obtain personal service26 upon the foreign defendant.
The desirability of reducing burdensome litigation does not appear
to warrant the harsh restriction that denies the fundamental quasi-in-
rei action, especially when the same results may be more equitably
achieved by a discretionary use of the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens.
The efficacy and desirability of the writ of foreign attachment as
extended to foreign actions ex delicto has been well recognized and
accepted in other jurisdictions.27 It is submitted that a decision inter-
preting Rule 1252 so as to extend to foreign actions ex delicto would
have been preferable. The application of the rule could then have




AND MINIMUM JURISDICTIONAL CONTACTS
Doing an act within a state or causing consequences therein are at
the outer limits of a state's jurisdiction in personaml over nonresi-
339 Pa. 533, 16o A.2d 549 (196o). For the application of the doctrine in other juris-
dictions see Barnett, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 Calif. L. Rev.
380 (1947); Foster, Place of Trial in Civil Actions, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1217 (1930);
Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo American Law, 29 Colum.
L. Rev. 1 (929).
'The distinction between an action in rem and an action in personam is
that in an action in rem a valid judgment may be obtained so far as it affects the
res without personal service of process, while in an action to recover a judgment
in personam process must be personally served or there must be a personal or
authorized appearance in the action." In re Blue's Estate, 67 Ohio App. 37, 32
N.E.2d 499, 507 (1939).
2Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant must be acquired before a
valid judgment in personam can be obtained. Such jurisdiction is obtained by
personally or constructively serving the defendant with notice of the pending suit.
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
"'For the general provisions for writs of foreign attachment in several states,
see note 17 supra.
'An action in personam is one in which "the technical object of the suit is
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dents. In section 17 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act 2 the Illinois
legislature has undertaken to go to the limits of the due process
clause of the Constitution.3 The constitutionality of the Illinois
statute, specifically of section 17(i)(b) relating to the commission of a
single tortious act as constituting the basis for in personam jurisdic-
tion, was recently questioned in Gray v. American Radiator & Sani-
tary Corp.
4
The specific problems presented by the Gray case were twofold:
(i) statutory interpretation, more specifically, the meaning of the
words "tortious act," and (2) the power of a state under federal con-
stitutional law to subject to its courts, by process other than personal
service within the state,5 a nonresident 6 for a tortious act committed
by the nonresident outside the territorial limits of the state, where the
injury occurs within the state.
Titan Valve Manufacturing Company manufactured a safety
valve outside Illinois.7 American Radiator & Sanitary Corporation
bought and installed the valve in a water heater which was sold to
the plaintiff.8 When the water heater was used in Illinois it exploded
and caused injury to the plaintiff. The plaintiff sued both Titan and
American Radiator for damages. The Illinois trial court dismissed the
action against Titan, but the Supreme Court of Illinois reversed.
to establish a claim against some particular person, with a judgment which gen-
erally in theory at least, binds his body...." Tyler v. Judges of Court of Registra-
tion, 175 Mass. 71, 55 N.E. 812, 814 (igoo). See Goodrich, Conflict of Laws § 72
(2d ed. 1949).
2111. Rev. Stat. c. iio, § 17 (1959). The pertinent parts of paragraph 17 are
as follows: "(i) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State, who
in person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby
submits said person, and, if an individual, his personal representative, to the juris-
diction of the courts of this State to any cause of action arising from the doing
of any of said acts: .... (b) The commission of a tortious act within this State."
3See Pembleton v. Illinois Commercial Men's Ass'n, 289 Ili. 99, 124 N.E. 355,
359 (igi9), dealing with the power of Illinois to give its courts jurisdiction in per-
sonam over a foreign corporation, in which the court stated that "the decisions in
this State as to due process of law under the Fourteenth federal amendment must
be controlled by the decisions of the federal courts rather than by the decisions
of our own or other state courts."
'22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (i96i).
GAn action in tort is transitory and, if personal service can be obtained on
the nonresident defendant anywhere in the state, the plaintiff can secure a personal
judgment against him. See Roper v. Brooks, ao La. 135, 9 So. 2d 485 (1942).
6The term "nonresident" as used in this comment in reference to the defendant,
Titan, means that it was, at the time of the commencement of the action, a
resident of another state.
7The court's syllabus to the case in the unofficial reporter states that the valve
was manufactured in Ohio.
8 -he court's syllabus to the case in the unofficial reporter states that the
1962] CASE COMMENTS 273
The defendant, Titan, contended that the words "commission of a
tortious act" did not mean the same thing as "commission of a tort,"
and section 17 would not apply to one who commits a tort by an
act done outside the state with consequences in the state.9 The Supreme
Court of Illinois held otherwise. Although a "tortious act" may mean
something different from a tort,' 0 the court interpreted the language
of section 17 to include those cases where -the negligent action alleged
in the complaint does not occur in Illinois but only the injury occurs in
Illinois.
In reaching its decision the Supreme Court of Illinois relied on
Nelson v. Miller." In the Nelson case, the defendant, a resident of
Wisconsin, sent an employee into Illinois to deliver a stove. At the
employee's request plaintiff assisted in unloading the stove. The
employee negligently pushed the stove and injured the plaintiff.
It was held that:
"[T]he jurisdictional requirements ... are met when the
defendant.., is the author of acts or omissions within the State,
and when the complaint states a cause of action in tort arising
from such conduct."' 2
The Nelson case holds that "tortious act" means an act alleged to be
tortious. In the Gray case the Illinois court is extending this concept
to include an injury in Illinois caused by an allegedly tortious act
committed outside the jurisdiction.
This Illinois rule, in the light of developing precedents in this
area, is believed to be constitutional under the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment.
The International Shoe Co. v. Washington'3 case announced a
liberal rule that greatly expanded the traditional concepts of state
jurisdiction over nonresidents. Justice Stone declared:
"Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment
in personam is grounded on their de facto power over the de-
fendant's person. Hence his presence within the territorial
jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to its rendition of a
valve was installed in the water heater in Pennsylvania and was sold to the con-
sumer in Illinois.
9176 N.E.2d at 763.
'Olt can be argued that the words "tortious act" are not synonymous with the
word "tort." "The former term, more restrictive than the latter, refers only to
the act or conduct and does not include the consequence thereof." McMahon v.
Boeing Airplane Co., 199 F. Supp. 9o8, 9og (N.D. Ill. ig6i).
nit Ill. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
"Id. at 681.
'3326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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judgment personally binding him.... But now that the capias
ad respondendum has given way to personal service of sum-
mons or other form of notice, due process requires only that in
order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he
be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.' "14
Significantly, the only positive limitation placed on the assumption
of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant by the International
Shoe Co. case is that due process "does not contemplate that a state
may make binding a judgment in personam against an individual or
corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or
relations."15
The defendant, Titan, ir the Gray case argued that this minimum
contact requirement had not been satisfied. The court, in rejecting
Titan's contention, relied in part on the United States Supreme
Court decision in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.'6 In the
McGee case the Court for the first time held that a single isolated
act was sufficient to comply with the minimum contact test laid down
in International Shoe. In McGee an insurance company, which so-
licited through the mails the purchase of an insurance policy and
thereafter mailed the insured premium notices, was held subject to the
jurisdiction of the state over causes of action arising from the policy.
A case which goes even leyond McGee is Zacharakis v. Bunker Hill
Mut. Ins. Co.,17 in which New York was held to have judicial juris-
diction over a Pennsylvania insurance company which, so far as it ap-
pears, had done no more than to mail a resident of New York a policy
insuring hotel property in New Hampshire and had received in re-
turn a premium mailed from New York. This case was cited, appar-
ently with approval, by the United States Supreme Court in the
McGee case.' 8
The current attitude of the Supreme Court towards problems of
allocating judicial jurisdiction among the states was clearly indi-
cated in Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp.'9 The defen-
dant issued a liability insurance policy to the manufacturer of a hair-
waving product, an Illinois subsidiary of a Delaware corporation hay-
RId. at 316.
S'lId. at 319. (Emphasis added.)
"'355 U.S. 220 (1957).
1281 App. Div. 487, 12o N.Y.S.2d 418 (1st Dep't 1953).
18355 U.S. at 223.
"348 U.S. 66 (1954).
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ing its headquarters in Massachusetts. The pblicy issued in Massachu-
setts or Illinois indemnified the insured against damages that might be
suffered by users of the product. The plaintiff, a resident of Louisiana,
was injured in using the product and instituted suit against the in-
surance company under the Louisiana direct action statute.20 As the
defendant insurance company was admitted to do business in Louisi-
ana, it could be served with personal service and there was no issue
as to jurisdiction over the person. However, the defendant denied
liability because the policy contained a "no action" clause, which
was valid under Massachusetts and Illinois law, prohibiting direct
actions against the insurer until final determination of the insured's
liability. The Supreme Court of the United States declared that
Louisiana could apply its own law rather than the law of Massachu-
setts or Illinois and upheld the constitutionality of the statute.21 The
Court reasoned that the interests of the states where the contract was
negotiated and delivered cannot outweigh the contracts and inter-
ests of Louisiana in taking care of persons injured in Louisiana. It
should be noted that the Court analyzed the contacts for the purpose of
solving a conflicts of laws problem (which state law to apply) rather
than to determine whether or not the Louisiana court had personal jur-
isdiction over the defendant. Yet the two problems are similar in that
they both concern the scope of the power of a court to render judg-
ment. If the Supreme Court is willing to follow the weight of con-
tacts in the one case it would seem to indicate that it should do so
in the other.
It is commonly recognized that the law of the place where the
injury occurs governs the right of action for a tort, no matter where
the act or omission causing the injury takes place.22 In the Gray case
the place of injury was Illinois where the explosion occurred. The
fact that Titan's conduct occurred outside of Illinois does not eliminate
the law of Illinois as a matter of choice of law. It knew the valve might
be sent into Illinois where the harm was done. This case is somewhat
similar to that of shooting a firearm across the state line,2 3 starting a
21La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22:655 (1950), allows a direct action against the liability
insurer without regard to a "no direct action" clause and without regard to the fact
that the contract of insurance may have been made in another state, where it is
binding.
2'"What has been said is enough to show Louisiana's legitimate interest in
,safeguarding the rights of persons injured there. In view of that interest, the
direct action provisions here challenged do not violate due process." 348 U.S. at 73.
2sThe lex loci deliciti governs in actions of tort. Northern Pac. Ry. v. Bab-
cock, 154 U.S. 190, 197 (1894); Jarrett v. Wabash Ry., 57 F.2d 669, 671 (2d Cir. 1932);
Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 412 (1934).
2Dallas v. Whitney, ni8 W. Va. io6, 188 S.E. 766 (1936).
